Parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh: an evaluation of the parliament during 1996-2009 by Moniruzzaman, Md.
Parliamentary Democracy
in Bangladesh: An Evaluation of
the Parliament during 1991–2006
M. MONIRUZZAMAN
Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia
ABSTRACT This study of three parliaments in Bangladesh during 1991–2006 argues
that parliament has failed to become the centre of political and legislative activities.
This is mainly because the ruling parties deliberately bypass parliament, while the
opposition deserts it. The parliament has been dysfunctional for more than half of its
tenure. For the short periods it has been active, its business sessions were devoted
more to party political bickering than legislative activity. Due to the opposition
boycott, the ruling party’s negligence and the absenteeism of ordinary members, the
standing committees of the parliaments were less effective, and parliamentary
accountability of government was lacking.
On gaining independence in 1971, Bangladesh adopted the Westminster model
of parliamentary democracy. The system, however, was replaced in quick succes-
sion by authoritarianism (Islam, 1986), single party system (Ahmed, 1991) and
personal rule (Moten, 1990). The mass upsurge against the personal rule of
General Hussein Muhammad Ershad in 1990 led to elections in 1991 which
once again installed the parliamentary system that lasted until 2006. During
this period, three elected parliaments completed the five-year constitutional term.
This study attempts a comparative analysis of the performance of the
Bangladesh parliament during the era of parliamentary democracy (1991–
2006). It analyses three parliaments, i.e. the Fifth (1991–95), Seventh
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(1996–2000) and the Eighth (2001–06). The Sixth Parliament, which lasted
for only 12 days (19–30March 1996) and passed only one law is inconsequen-
tial to the analysis attempted here. The three parliaments are assessed using the
following criteria: attitude of the ruling party towards parliament; attitude of
the opposition parties towards parliament; nature of parliamentary sessions;
administration of business sessions; and finally, the public accountability of
the parliament. The study argues that despite the adoption of a parliamentary
system, the parliament largely remained ineffective and dysfunctional.
Basic Features of the Three Parliaments
The fifth parliamentary elections were held on 27 February 1991 under the
caretaker government. A total of 2,063 candidates belonging to 75 political
parties and 424 independent candidates contested the elections for 300
seats. In the elections, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) emerged as
the single largest party obtaining 140 seats followed by Awami League
(AL) 88, Jatiya Party (JP) 35 and Jamat-i-Islami (JI) 18, respectively (see
Table 1). The BNP formed the government with JI support while AL was
declared the parliamentary opposition (Baxter & Rahman, 1991).
The seventh parliamentary elections were held on 12 June 1996 which
registered an unprecedented 74.15 per cent voter turnout. A total of 81
parties contested the elections. Contesting all 300 seats, AL secured 146, 58
seats up from 1991; BNP bagged 116, down 24 from 199; JP won 32, down
3 from 1991. Compared to AL’s increase in seats, BNP’s loss was minimal
despite its suffering from an anti-government movement during the last two
years of its rule. While JP maintained almost same number of seats, JI per-
formed badly gaining only 3, down 15 from 1991. In the Seventh Parliament,
the former opposition AL formed the cabinet with the support of JP, while the
former ruling party BNP went into opposition. The BNP became the largest
opposition party in the parliamentary history of Bangladesh.
The eighth parliamentary elections were held on 1 October 2001 and were
contested in a different manner. A strong coalition of four parties namely the
BNP, JI, JP and Islami Okkyo Jote (IOJ) confronted the AL and won 264 seats.
AL performed poorly securing only 62 seats, compared to 146 in the previous
election, giving the coalition an easy and comfortable majority. The four-party
alliance formed the government under the leadership of BNP. The AL
denounced the result outright and resorted to ‘street politics’ accusing the
BNP of election fraud.1
The three parliaments completed the five-year terms as stipulated in the
Constitution. As shown in Table 1, in the three parliaments none of the
parties had an absolute majority of seats; consequently, the larger parties
depended upon the JP or JI to form the government.
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Ruling Party Attitude towards Parliament: Deliberate Bypassing
It is standard parliamentary procedure that the government initially presents a
white paper on an important issue before introducing legislation. The issue is
then publicly debated by various concerned and interest groups throughout the
country. Taking various opinions and concerns into consideration, the govern-
ment presents the bill to the parliament. The bill in turn goes to the concerned
parliamentary committee for scrutiny and at the same time is discussed in the
House. Finally, the House decides on the bill. However, it is observed that due
to their comfortable majority in parliament ruling parties in Bangladesh chose
to bypass the parliament in making major laws.
The dominance of the Treasury Bench was quite apparent during the Fifth
Parliament (1991–95). According to the pre-election agreement among the
political parties, the primary duty of the Fifth Parliament was to agree a
Table 1. Elections and composition of the three parliaments, 1991–2006
Major parties
Fifth Parliament
(1991–95) seats
Seventh
Parliament
(1996–2000)
seats
Eighth Parliament
(2001–06) seats
Contested Won Contested Won Contested Won
BNP 300 140 300 116 300 264 (4-party
alliance)
AL 264 88 300 146 300 56
JP 272 35 293 32 300 17(JP Ershad)
JI 222 18 300 3
BAKSAL 68 5
CPB 49 5
IOJ 165 1
JSD and Other 1188 6 935 1
Independents 424 3 281 1
Government
formed by
BNP AL BNP-led coalition
BNP ¼ Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
AL ¼ Awami Leasue.
JP ¼ Jatiya Party.
JI ¼ Jamat-i-Islami.
BAKSAL ¼ Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League.
CPB ¼ Communist Party of Bangladesh.
IOJ ¼ Islami Oikkyo Jot.
JSD ¼ Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal.
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Bangladesh Elections Commission, 1991,
1996, 2001.
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constitutional amendment to switch to the parliamentary system. However,
some sources indicate that the ruling BNP was not much inclined to immedi-
ately change the constitution as it wanted to enjoy some prerogatives of the
presidential system introduced earlier by President Ziaur Rahman (Hakim,
1992). Thus the Treasury Bench, in the beginning of the Fifth Parliament, pro-
mulgated three ordinances relating to restrictions on floor crossing in the
House, the Presidential Election Act and Presidential Election Amendment
Act which proposed presidential election through open ballot. Apparently,
through these ordinances the government wanted to ensure election of its pre-
sidential candidate in the House.
Laws relating to these issues were inseparably related to the proposed con-
stitutional amendment. The ruling party wanted to strengthen the power of the
president before it opted for constitutional amendment favouring parliamen-
tary democracy. However, the ruling party had to back down because of oppo-
sition pressure and because the High Court declared the promulgations illegal.
Finally, the BNP moved the Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Bill 1991 in
the House on 2 July, which was referred to a 15 member Select Committee
consisting of the ruling and opposition parties for review. The committee
came up with a unanimous report and placed it before the House on 6
August for approval. After two rounds of voting, the Bill was passed by 307
votes to none. The proposed change in the constitution was subsequently rati-
fied in a nationwide referendum held in September making parliamentary
democracy constitutional (Hakim & Haque, 1994).
Despite constitutional change, the attitude of the ruling party towards
parliament remained unchanged. In this, it was assisted by the opposition
boycott of the parliament. The Fifth Parliament under BNP had very little
opportunity to engage in legislative activities, and arguably the boycott led
the government to promulgate laws easily. The BNP government during
1991–95 passed most of its 172 laws enacted by promulgation. Only 4.0 per
cent of the total bills were scrutinised by the relevant committees, and an
impressive 34.7 per cent of the bills were originally ordinances (see Table 2).
Table 2. Nature of bills passed by the parliaments
Parliaments
Nature of bills (% of total)
Ordinance-turned bills New bills Bills scrutinised by committees
Fifth 21.0 34.7 4.0
Seventh 28.4 8.4 92.06
Eighth 185 4.0 29.0
Source: Ahmed (2003); ‘Parliament Watch: 2001–2006 (February, 2007)’. Available at http://
www.ti-bangladesh.org/index.php?page_id¼401 (accessed 17 April 2007).
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A prominent ordinance-turned bill was the Anti-Terrorist Bill (1994) aimed at
controlling the deteriorating law and order in the country. This bill was report-
edly promulgated when it was under review by the parliamentary committee.
It was presented later to the parliament for approval. The BNP coalition gov-
ernment during the Eighth Parliament (2001–06) also maintained the same
attitude of executive domination of the legislature. The most important of
the 185 bills that the BNP government passed, such as the Speedy Trial
Tribulation Act 2002, during the Eighth Parliament were by promulgation.
During the Fifth and Eighth Parliaments, bills scrutinised by concerned com-
mittees were negligible (see Table 2).
The ruling party AL during the Seventh Parliament (1996–2001) also main-
tained the heavy hand of the executive branch in making laws. The AL
government deliberately bypassed the parliament on many occasions and
promulgated a substantial number of ordinances that were later ratified by
the parliament. Among the three most important ordinance-turned bills
passed in the Seventh Parliament were: Ganges Water Sharing Treaty with
India (1996), Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Treaty (1997), and Anti-
Terrorist Bill (2000). In making these laws the parliament played only a sec-
ondary role of mere ratification. These three bills followed none of the
prescribed procedures. However, during the Seventh Parliament 92 per cent
of the bills were scrutinised by the relevant committees before being presented
to the parliament for approval.
The AL generally tended to sideline the parliament during the Seventh
Parliament despite the fact that the BNP as opposition party remained rela-
tively more parliament-oriented, at least initially. Sharing of Ganges water
with India has been a persistent national problem dating back to the Pakistani
period. After independence, the problem remained unsolved as India disre-
garded Bangladeshi requests. The AL, which had traditionally maintained
cordial relations with India, seized the opportunity to deal with the problem.
Within six months of its coming to power it signed a 30-year water sharing
treaty with India in December 1996.
The Ganges Water Treaty came as a complete surprise. The government
maintained tight secrecy about the negotiations leading to the treaty,
keeping the parliament and the nation in the dark. The government disclosed
the upcoming treaty little more than a week earlier. Experts believed that the
secrecy maintained was motivated by a desire to present the nation with a
pleasant surprise and to claim exclusive credit. But the government failed
to recognise that it was following a strategy subversive to the parliamentary
system. It also believed that the secrecy was maintained under strong
Indian pressure due to its fear that such a long-term treaty would face tremen-
dous opposition in Bangladesh. The treaty was subsequently ratified in the
parliament by virtue of a sheer majority with no discussion. Such practices
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were tantamount to following the practice of the authoritarian regime. The AL
was severely criticised for its deliberate bypassing of parliament on this
important issue.
About a year later in 1997 the AL signed the historic Chittagong Hill Tracts
Peace Treaty. The tribes of the Chittagong Hill Tracts region had been strug-
gling for independence since 1971. Until 1997, the governments resisted the
demand of independence or autonomy for the region. The AL government
decided to grant autonomy to the region through an executive order. The gov-
ernment turned down numerous requests to have a parliamentary debate on the
issue, and went ahead with signing the treaty and submitting it to the parliament
for ratification. During discussion in the parliament, there were as many as
1,455 amendments made on each of the four bills relating to the CHT treaty,
and considering the unmanageability of responding to all these amendments
only 11 opposition members were given the floor to speak on the bills.
The People Security Act 2000 was enacted by promulgation as well. In a
similar way, many of the 190 laws enacted during the AL government had
been ordinance-turned bills. Examples of such promulgations are national holi-
days on Sheikh Mujib’s birthday and demise, Sheikh Mujib’s Return Day,2
National Mourning Day,3 two days of weekly holiday, and the mandatory
display of Sheikh Mujib’s portrait in every public office and subsidised edu-
cational institutions. Among the bills that were passed by the House without
following proper procedures were the Indemnity Ordinance (Repeal) Bill
and conferring on Sheikh Mujib the titles of Bangabandhu and Father of the
Nation. In early September 2000, the government also approved a proposal
to repeal the Enemy Property Law, a legacy of the Pakistani past.4
The most controversial bill that the government had passed by the Seventh
Parliament in the absence of the opposition was the Father of the Nation
Family Members Security Act. The law provided for lifelong security by
the Special Security Force (SSF), along with other large benefits, to the
sisters Sheikh Hasina Wazed and Sheikh Rehana Siddique, as daughters of
the late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. These included houses for the sisters,
a grant of one million Taka to the children of Sheikh Rehana, as well as
a monthly allowance of Taka 1,500 until they attained the age of 25 years.
Sheikh Hasina was allocated the prime minister’s official residence, while
Sheikh Rehana was given a state-owned house worth $US10 million at a
token price of Taka 1,001. Sheikh Hasina was also entitled to a six-member
personal catering staff, free medical treatment in the country and abroad, a
fleet of cars, free telephone, and SSF military protection when abroad.
One obvious sign of the ruling party’s attitude was the poor attendance by
the prime minister of parliamentary sessions in all the three parliaments.
During the Seventh and Eighth Parliament, the PM attended the House for
only a few out of the total working days.
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Opposition Attitude towards Parliament: Deliberate Desertion
If the ruling parties generally tended to undermine the parliament, the opposi-
tion parties used the strategy of ‘boycotting the sessions’ to put the sitting gov-
ernment under pressure. Desertion of parliament on the part of opposition
parties has been observed as a dominant phenomenon in Bangladesh politics
during the last three parliaments. The opposition deserted the Fifth Parliament
300 (75 per cent) out of a total of 400 days at work; it deserted the Seventh
Parliament 156 (40.83 per cent) out of a total of 382 days, and it deserted
the Eighth Parliament 223 (59.78 per cent) out of 373 days at work (see
Table 3). During the three parliaments the opposition remained absent for
58.78 per cent of the sessions.
The tendency to boycott or desert the parliament is probably due to the
experience of non-cooperation, mass agitation, street demonstrations and
violent politics during the Ershad regime (1980s). Street politics overthrew
the Ershad regime and was successfully utilised to make the BNP government
very unpopular during the Fifth Parliament. Secondly, the ruling AL and BNP
during the 1991–2006 parliamentary era had very little experience of parlia-
mentary etiquette compared to anti-government opposition and street politics.
Until 1991, the BNP ruled for about three years (1979–82) and were in oppo-
sition for about ten years (1982–91). In the case of AL, it was in opposition,
until assuming power in mid-1996, for over 20 years compared to ruling for
about three and a half years (1972–75). Therefore, the extra-parliamentary
behaviour of the opposition in the form of boycotts and street politics contin-
ued to dominate opposition behaviour.
Table 3. Opposition presence and boycott of parliament
Parliament Opposition
Under study Tenure Sessions
At
work
(days)
Boycott
(days)
Presence
(days)
Absenteeism
(%)
Fifth
(1991–95)
4y 8m 22 400 300 100 75.00
Seventh
(1996–2000)
5y 18 382 156 126 40.83
Eighth
(2001–06)
5y 23 373 223 150 59.78
Total 1159 679 376 58.78
Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author based on various sources such as the New Age
(Dhaka), 28 Oct. 2006; Daily Star (Dhaka), 28 Oct. 2005; Daily Naya Diganta (Dhaka),
28 Oct. 2006.
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During 1991–2006, AL and its allies twice went to the opposition benches,
while BNP and its allies went once. But while on the opposition benches AL
and BNP demonstrated a similar attitude towards the parliament. Immediately
after elections the would-be opposition party rejected the election results out-
right, alleging electoral corruption, threatened to boycott the oath-taking
session but attended eventually and walked out immediately. During the sub-
sequent sessions, the opposition boycotted the parliament on various grounds
and sometimes for a number of sessions continuously, but attended the parlia-
ment for a brief period prior to 90 consecutive days of absence.5
After the 1991 general elections, the AL rejected the results and immedi-
ately started an anti-government movement through agitation, demonstrations
and violence (Baxter,1992). The AL leader allegedly vowed to the ruling BNP
‘you have won the power, but we will not let you be in peace for even a day’
(Daily Inqilab, 26 March 1991). As such, immediately after the opposition
took the oath, it resorted to street politics, deserting the parliament. A
number of issues during the first three years of the Fifth Parliament favoured
AL’s anti-government politics which ultimately developed a tradition of boy-
cotting parliament.
Opposition during the Fifth Parliament
During the Fifth Parliament the opposition boycott of the parliament centred
on three major issues, namely the Ghulam Azam and Magura-2 by-elections,
and the caretaker government. On these issues, the opposition completely and
consistently boycotted nine of the total 22 sessions (see Table 3). Firstly,
Ghulam Azam was officially declared the leader of the JI in 1991, which
the opposition AL and its allies did not accept on the ground of his alleged
foreign citizenship.6 The following year a civilian committee named Ghada-
nik held a mock trial of Ghulam Azam in an open court for war crimes in 1971
and sentenced him to death. The AL actively sided with and supported the
Ghadanik move and demanded that Ghulam Azam be tried for war crimes.
The opposition boycotted the parliament several times over this demand and
staged general strikes nationwide. In response to the opposition pressure
and public disorder created, the government arrested Ghulam Azam and
referred his case to the court.7
The second major issue concerned the Magura-2 parliamentary seat which
fell vacant in 1993 due to the death of its AL representative. This seat was an
AL stronghold, but in the by-election the AL lost to a BNP candidate. The AL
accused the government of election fraud, rejected the election result and
bolstered the anti-government movement through further alienating the parlia-
ment. The opposition boycott of parliament now centred on the fourth major
issue – a demand for total reform of the Elections Commission (EC) and
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introduction of a caretaker government that would conduct all general elec-
tions. The ruling party did not yield to any of these demands and the opposi-
tion maintained a continuous boycott of parliament.
Consequently, the parliament was rendered virtually irrelevant for about two
years, which worried the ruling party. The political instability in Bangladesh
even attracted foreign attention. To appease the opposition, the government
proposed an interim government and attempted to amend the People’s Repre-
sentative Order 1972 aiming at strengthening the electoral process and the EC,
but the opposition rejected such initiatives. Several efforts by the Speaker of
the House failed to produce any result. The good offices extended by the
Commonwealth Secretary General Emeka Anyaoku and former Governor
General of Australia Sir Ninian Stephen to mediate the crisis failed due to
opposition stubbornness.8 The US ambassador and the British and Canadian
High Commissioners’ efforts to mediate also failed to make any breakthrough.
Opposition politics achieved high momentum when a section of civil
service professionals joined hands with the opposition. The opposition took
for granted the downfall of the BNP government, so it pushed the parliament
towards further irrelevance. It announced an ultimatum to the government to
either accept the demand for a caretaker government by 27 December 1994, or
face an en masse resignation from the parliament on the following day. The
Speaker’s final attempt was also unsuccessful resulting in an en masse resig-
nation by the opposition on 28 December after fulfilling a parliamentary
boycott for 300 days. During these 300 days of boycott, the opposition main-
tained street politics through mass agitation, demonstrations and frequent
hartals.9 In 1994 alone, the opposition observed 14 nationwide hartals, four
blockades, and three gheraos (siege).10 The democratically elected opposition
was active in the streets while the parliament remained neglected. As
Rasheduzzaman (1997: 258) observes:
For two years, Bangladesh democracy was caught between a govern-
ment whose credibility was questioned and an irresponsible opposition
that stimulated the destabilising street politics instead of working
through the constitutional process. As a result public esteem for both
the government and the opposition dwindled and politicians were
viewed with cynicism. Intellectual permissiveness toward unfettered
hartal, boycott, and protests was a dangerous signal for democracy
and institution-building.
Opposition during the Seventh Parliament
BNP in its turn in opposition during the Seventh Parliament (1996-2000)
continued the inherited method of deliberate desertion of parliament, following
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in the footsteps of theAL. Compared to BNP, theAL government (asmentioned
earlier) passed a number of important bills in the parliament and the opposition
had proper opportunity to challenge those bills in the parliament. Instead, the
opposition continued the anti-government drive through boycotting the parlia-
ment and numerous hartals, sit-in protests, demonstrations and non-
cooperation until June 2000. After keeping the parliament paralysed for
about 11 months (Table 4) the opposition returned to the House on 20 June
2000 for a while. The opposition reasoned that its return to parliament was
in order to prevent constitutional change, while political observers explained
that the move was meant to save its membership which would expire in
about 23 days due to continuous absence.11
True to extra-parliamentary activities, the opposition BNP and its allies
observed 276 days of nationwide hartals and strikes in relation to particularly
the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Treaty.
During the Seventh Parliament, the BNP and other opposition parties boy-
cotted for 156 days, and, either partially or completely, ten out of a total of
18 sessions. Even if the opposition attended the parliament sometimes, it
made repeated walkouts on mostly trivial issues. During the Seventh Parlia-
ment the opposition recorded 100 walkouts.
Opposition during the Eighth Parliament
During the Eighth Parliament, the opposition AL behaved in the traditional
pattern. It stayed away from the first two sessions and first attended the parlia-
ment in its third session (24 June 2002), eight months after its beginning; but
then boycotted the parliament from 25 June 2003, rejoining it on 12 May 2004
to retain membership. Again the opposition started a prolonged boycott from
31 January 2005, and returned to parliament on 12 February 2006 to save its
Table 4. Sample attendance of members in the Eighth Parliament (% of the total 373
working days)
Presence Number of MPs Absence
Number of MPs and
their affiliation
50% 113 (out of 330) 75% or more 48 (17 ruling, 31
opposition)
76% 74 (out of 330) 75% 61 (30 ruling, 31
opposition)
50% or more 104 (47 ruling, 61 opposition) 60% opposition boycott
Source: prepared by the author based on ‘Parliament Watch: 2001–2006 (February, 2007)’.
Available at http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/index.php?page_id¼401 (accessed 17 April 2007).
Parliamentary Democracy in Bangladesh 109
membership. The opposition AL boycotted the parliament for 223 out of a
total of 373 working days. Therefore, the major characteristic of the three
parliaments is that they were boycotted by the opposition most of the time.
Out of a total 1,155 working days, the three parliaments were boycotted for
679 days, and worked for only 476 days. This means the parliaments
worked for only 41.12 per cent of total days and remained boycotted for
58.78 per cent (Table 3).
Apart from party decisions, individual members of both the treasury and
opposition benches generally showed a relaxed attitude to attending parlia-
mentary sessions. Besides declared boycotts and routine walkouts, the
members generally avoided attendance. A survey of attendance in the
Eighth Parliament shows this general pattern (see Table 4).
Many believe that the opposition during the three parliaments could have
played a more constructive role by attending the parliament instead of desert-
ing it.12 Common people have been developing an increasingly negative atti-
tude towards such irresponsible behaviour by the opposition. A survey
conducted in 2000 suggested that 69.94 per cent of the public believed that
both parties were responsible for the parliamentary impasse, while 16.46
per cent held the ruling party and 13.60 per cent held the opposition respon-
sible for deserting the parliament.13 A particular claim of the opposition has
been that they were given disproportionately less time to speak in the
House compared to the treasury bench members. A survey of time utilisation
in the three parliaments substantiates the claim. However, the claimed level of
disproportion is apparently not substantial. A sample survey of the Seventh
Parliament shows that the treasury bench enjoyed 140.87 hours, while the
opposition was given 113.02 hours for deliberations. However, the opposition
enjoyed more time for deliberations on a number of issues such as Thanks
Motion on Presidential Speech and General Law and Order situation (see
Table 5).
An analysis of the three parliaments under study shows that the opposition
usually attended three types of sessions – budget, vote of thanks on the
Presidential speech, and the session that supposedly annuls membership due
to continuous absence. However, as Table 4 shows, there was a general
tendency of absenteeism from the parliament in the members of both the
ruling and the opposition parties. The opposition leader, for instance, during
the Eighth Parliament attended only 45 out of a total of 373 sittings.
Nature of Parliamentary Sessions
This section analyses the nature of deliberations in parliamentary sessions. It
underscores three basic characteristics: abusive deliberations, personality cult
and the accusation/counter-accusation game.
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Abusive Deliberations
Parliamentarians and legislators are judged by their eloquent deliberations,
sound and rational reasoning in debate, and critical analysis and alternative
suggestions for contentious issues. However, the most disappointing aspect
of the parliamentary business sessions has been the absence of these essential
qualities in the legislators. Discussions and deliberations were generally con-
fined to eulogising respective party leaders and abusing opponents. All the
major political parties were branded with specific derogatory labels by each
other. Following are some of the abusive terms used in the parliament:
Dalal: Collaborator, a very insulting remark against JI for its 1971 pro-
Pakistani role.
Shwadhinatar shatru: Enemy of national independence, used by all
parties against each other.
Janagoner shatru: Enemy of the people, used by all parties against each
other.
Panchattarer ghatok: Killer of 1975, referring to the BNP for its alleged
involvement in killing Mujib, his family and associates by military coup.
Ekattarer ghatok o dalal: Collaborator and killer of 1971, referring to JI
and other Islamic parties that opposed the war of independence and col-
laborated with the Pakistani regime.
Shairachari: Autocrat, referring especially to Ershad.
Bishwabeheya: Great adulterer, referring to Ershad.
Chor: Thief, referring to the BNP in relation to its alleged election fraud
and fertiliser scandal.
Discussions and deliberations were mostly found to be irrelevant and off the
topic. For instance, a partial survey (2003–06) of the Eighth Parliament
suggests that the MPs resorted to irrelevant discussion 962 times, of which
the ruling party MPs shared 70.79 per cent and the opposition accounted for
29.21 per cent. There were some 547 occasions when the Speaker had to
issue warnings over irrelevant discussion, and he switched off the micro-
phones of the MPs 66 times for the same reason, for which both the ruling
and opposition were equally responsible (see Table 6). In some extreme situ-
ations the Speaker had to suspend the sessions several times to control abusive,
noisy and derogatory deliberations.
Personality Cult
Personality cult was a dominant characteristic of business sessions in all three
parliaments (Table 6). The AL had been obsessed with the cult of the person of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the celebrated party leader and the leader of
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independence movement and the first president of the nation. Similarly, Ziaur
Rahman, founder of the BNP, was idolised by the BNP as the true architect of
the nation. During the parliamentary sessions, members of each party deliv-
ered emotional addresses glorifying their respective leaders, and exchanged
abusive, pejorative and humiliating remarks about opponents. During 2003–
06, there were some 1,058 times when the ruling party (74 per cent) and the
opposition (26 per cent) made contributions focusing on a personality cult
(see Table 6). The AL was found to be more excessive in building up a
personality cult and institutionalised the practice. It passed a bill conferring
on SheikhMujib the title of Father of the Nation and namedmany streets, build-
ings, academic and cultural institutions, and bridges after him. Numerous cul-
tural and social organisations were also named after him. A number of national
holidays were declared commemorating various occasions in his political life.
Textbooks and state controlled media put special emphasis on his personality.
He was termed ‘the greatest Bangalee of a thousand years’. In addition to
building up the personality cults of their great leaders, both the AL and
BNP also developed the personality cults of their current leaders, Sheikh
Hasina and Begum Khaleda respectively.
Accusation and Counter-accusation Game
All the three parliaments were full of accusations and counter-accusations
during business sessions. The AL, when in opposition, accused the BNP gov-
ernment of inefficiency, autocracy and corruption, while the BNP in its turn
accused the AL government of the same. During the 2003–06 parliamentary
sessions alone there were some 990 instances of accusation and counter-
accusation recorded, of which the ruling and the opposition parties’ shares
Table 6. Nature of parliamentary sessions (partially from 2003 to 2006)
Issues
Total number
of incidents
Ruling party
MPs (%)
Opposition
MPs (%)
Personality cult 1,058 74 26
Discussion switching to irrelevant
issues
962 70.79 29.21
Warning given to MPs for
irrelevant discussion
547 67 33
Switching off microphone 66 50 50
Accusation/counter-accusation 990 71.01 29.09
Source: prepared by the author based on ‘Parliament Watch: 2001–2006 (February, 2007)’.
Available at http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/index.php?page_id¼401 (accessed 17 April 2007).
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were 71.01 per cent and 29.09 per cent respectively. Interestingly, most of their
respective accusations were strikingly similar (see Table 7). Some of the major
accusations are mentioned below, a few of which are merely situational.
Despite these accusations, governments of both parties, however, failed to
accomplish four basic aims highlighted in election campaigns. These were: 1)
repeal of Special Power Act (SPA); 2) independence of judiciary; 3) press and
media freedom; and 4) turning parliament into the centre of all legislative and
political activities. None of the political parties have kept their promise but
Table 7. List of accusations against each other
AL’s accusations against BNP rule BNP’s accusations against AL rule
1 Incapable of guaranteeing law and
order, defending properties and
lives, mitigating terrorism on the
University campuses, unravelling
the crisis of CHT
Deteriorating law and order situation,
increase of terrorism and violence
against women, continuous CHT
problem
2 Police brutality towards journalists Incapable of handling share market
3 Politicisation of administration Politicisation of civil administration
4 Total control of TV, radio and news
media.
Monopolising TV, radio and electronic
media
5 Resorting to black laws and retaining
of special power act
Increased repression against opposition
activists; retention and abuse of
special power act
6 Passing of Anti-terrorist bill Passing of People’s Security Act
7 Harassment of political opponents Anti-BNP propaganda on state
controlled media
8 Unilateral decisions on important
national issues
Unilateral formation of parliamentary
standing committees
9 Intolerant attitude towards opposition Blames opposition for failure and all
terrorist activities; intolerant attitude
in parliament
10 Dictatorship of Prime Minister Absence of constitutional rule and
unilateral decision-making
11 Fraud and rigging in election Rigging in elections
12 Incapable of ruling the country Cannot solve the crisis in power sector
13 Sovereignty and independence under
threat
Selling the country to India through
making unfair treaties, offering a
corridor, buying electricity and
selling gas
14 Rehabilitation of anti-liberation forces Controlling campuses under police
protection
15 Corruption and mismanagement Nepotism and corruption
16 Resorting to conspiracy theory and
shifting responsibility of inefficiency
Source: Compiled by the author based on various sources.
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they accused each other of failure and intentional use of power contained in
some of these institutions.
During parliamentary deliberations, the ruling party always claimed to
be right in all its decisions and viewed its legislation as devoid of any short-
comings, mistakes and criticism. At the same time it considered opposition
demands and criticism unconstitutional, false, conspiratorial and as agitation.
The sitting government claimed its legitimate right to stay in power, while
it considered the opposition’s anti-government movement unconstitutional,
vindictive and vengeful. Deliberations and debates mostly revolved around
past misdeeds, failure and corruption of the earlier regime, each accused by
the other. The ruling party blamed the previous government for destruction
and exploitation, while the opposition blamed the sitting government for
every problem the country faced. Even the opposition AL went so far to
label Prime Minister Khaleda Zia as dainy (witch), responsible for natural
disasters in the country.
Administration of Parliamentary Sessions
The parliament was not only neglected by the ruling and opposition parties but
it also suffered from its own administrative inefficiencies. All the three parlia-
ments demonstrated inefficiencies in the Speaker of the House, Business of the
House, and the secretariat.
Speaker
In all the three parliaments, a common accusation against Speakers was their
alleged partisan behaviour in conducting the parliamentary sessions. The
Speakers were accused of not giving equal or even adequate opportunity to
opposition members vis-a`-vis the ruling party members during deliberations.
Such behaviour by the Speakers had caused the opposition to walk out on
many occasions and sometimes embark on a prolonged boycott in protest.
Consequently, the Speakers in the past had to make a formal promise to
behave impartially. In the Seventh Parliament, the Speaker introduced an arbi-
trary rule of a compulsory signing system for the MPs which invited vehement
criticism from the opposition, and was eventually abandoned.14
Business of the House
It is difficult to compare the three parliaments in relation to the Business of the
House because of the various periods that the parliament was boycotted
by the opposition. Yet four particular aspects can be looked at to evaluate
the Business of the House. These aspects are: total number of starred and
116 M. Moniruzzaman
non-starred questions answered by the treasury bench, number of adjournment
motions received and entertained, number of notices received and accepted for
discussion on matters of urgent public importance for general as well as for
short duration, and, finally, no confidence motions.
Firstly, question and answer sessions are an important part of the Business of
the House. Members of parliament usually get an opportunity to interrogate
ministers in these sessions. However, in this regard, all three parliaments
showed a particular pattern from the treasury bench that theministers concerned
often replied sarcastically to opposition questions, bypassing the real issue. In
terms of answering questions from the floor, the three parliaments answered
25.2, 32.8 and 41.1 per cent, respectively (see Table 8). The Eighth Parliament
saw a total of 15,277 starred and non-starred questions answered.
Secondly, in terms of adjournment motions, the Fifth Parliament received
1,790 notices of which only 64 were accepted for discussion. Of the 64
notices, 38 were from the opposition. On matters of urgent public importance
in general, the House received 5,156 notices, of which 377, including 251
from the opposition, were accepted for discussion. On the other hand, the
House received 774 notices on the same issue for short duration, of which
Table 8. Status of motions: comparative performance
Issues Notices Fifth Parliament
Seventh
Parliament
Eighth
Parliament
Adjournment
motions
Notices received 1790 4450 2530
Notices accepted 64 (3.57%) 0.00% 0.00%
Opposition notices
accepted
38 (59.37%) NA 152
Discussion on
matters of
urgent public
interest
Notices received 5156 1528 10407
Notices accepted 377 (4.00%) 456
(3.00%)
416
(4.00%)
Opposition notices
accepted
251 (66.57%) NA NA
Discussion on
matters of
urgent public
interest for
short duration
Notices received 774 561 226
Notices accepted 68 (3.4%) NA 8 (2.00%)
Opposition notices
accepted
62 (91.47%) NA NA
Half-an-hour
discussion
Notices received 133 21 8
Notices accepted (0.80%) None
(0.00%)
None
(0.00%)
No confidence
motion
Motion tabled 1 (unsuccessful) None None
Source: Partially based on Ahmed (2003), and author’s compilation from various sources.
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only 68 including 62 from the opposition were entertained. The performance
of both the Seventh and Eighth Parliaments in these regards was extremely
poor. The Seventh Parliament received 4,450 notices of adjournment, 1,528
notices for matters of urgent public interest, of which 456 were accepted,
but none of the 561 notices for short duration and 21 notices for half-an-
hour discussion was accepted by the House. The Eighth Parliament received
a total of 2,530 notices of adjournment motion of which 152 were from the
opposition, but none of the notices were accepted. The House discussed
only three matters of general importance. The House accepted 416 (4.00 per
cent) out of 10,407 notices on matters of urgent public interest, eight (2.00
per cent) out of 226 notices for short duration discussion, and accepted
none of eight notices for half-an-hour discussion.
Finally, the most remarkable Business of the House during the Fifth Parlia-
ment was the no-confidence motion which was unsuccessful. This is the only
instance in the history of Bangladesh. There was no such motion placed in the
Seventh and Eighth Parliaments.
In addition to the parsimonious Business of the House, the members’
participation in various matters had not been encouraging as well. A sample
scanning of the Eighth Parliament suggests that most of the members
were generally found not to be interested in taking part in discussions (see
Table 9).
Secretariat
The secretariat of the three parliaments was frequently found to be inefficient
in administering the issues in accordance with parliamentary rules of pro-
cedure. The Fifth Parliament performed relatively better, but the Seventh
Parliament in comparison performed worst of the three. Two particular
Table 9. Activism of the MPs in discussion on various issues in the Eighth Parliament
Issues
MPs
participated Total
MPs did not participate
Ruling party
MPs
Opposition
MPs
1. Matters of urgent public
importance
NA 110 66% 68%
2. Presidential speech 118 182 151 31
3. PM’s question hour 47 203 203
4. Budget 201 99 80 19
Source: prepared by the author based on ‘Parliament Watch: 2001–2006 (February 2007)’, http://
www.ti-bangladesh.org/index.php?page_id¼401 (accessed 17 April 2007).
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instances of the Seventh Parliament demonstrate the inefficiency of the
secretariat.15
First, following the defection of two MPs from the BNP to the AL, the par-
liament secretariat declared that their seats would not be vacated, though the
secretariat has no jurisdiction to make such a decision. This decision was later
challenged in the High Court which asked the parliament secretariat to refer
the matter to the Elections Commission, the only body that could decide in
such matters. According to Article 66 (2.4) of the constitution, such matters
should be referred to the EC and its decision would be final. But the way sec-
retariat acted showed that it had overridden the EC and interpreted the law in
the ruling party’s favour.
The second example of its inefficiency was the repetition of the same
mistake of overriding the Election Commission in declaring a seat vacant.
According to the constitution, if an MP is convicted by a court, then his or
her parliamentary seat would be declared cancelled. Immediately following
the High Court indictment of H.M. Ershad in the Janata Tower case,16 the par-
liament secretariat declared his parliamentary seat vacant. This declaration by
the secretariat was made at a time when all the high officials including the
Speaker, parliament secretary, and additional secretary were abroad, and the
deputy speaker was outside Dhaka. In the absence of these principal officers,
another additional secretary ordered the gazette notification from the sec-
retariat. The secretariat clarified this, saying that the notification was made
with the consent of the Speaker who was visiting the United States at the
time. Ershad responded to the notification by declaring it ‘total madness’.17
It was ‘madness’ not only because the case was still undecided due to
appeal, but also because of the overriding of the EC by the secretariat. As
in the first instance, the High Court invalidated the secretariat gazette for
two months, ordered the secretariat to refer the matter to the EC, and issued
a show-cause notice asking for an explanation of why the notification
should not be considered invalid. Hasty decisions by the parliamentary sec-
retariat demonstrated poor performance in following the rules of procedure,
which tarnished the image of parliament.
Parliamentary Accountability of Government
Parliamentary accountability is the bedrock of good governance in a demo-
cratic system. Both the treasury bench and opposition scrutinise each other’s
activities, and they remain responsible and answerable to the parliament. In
practice, however, there was a serious lack of parliamentary accountability.
In a parliamentary democracy, many of the important parliamentary over-
sights and legislative functions should be performed by parliamentary stand-
ing committees. But due to the dysfunctional nature of the parliament,
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standing committees had a number of serious limitations. Firstly, the commit-
tee formation took an unexpectedly long time. For instance, the most import-
ant Public Account Committees (PACs) in the Fifth Parliament were formed
more than seven months after the dissolution of the previous PACs, while the
Seventh Parliament took about a year after the dissolution of the earlier PACs
(Bhuiyan, 1998), and the Eighth Parliament took two years to form 50 PACs.
Secondly, under the existing Rules of Procedure, the standing committees
have very limited functions. The dominance of the executive branch over
the legislature did not require bills to be necessarily scrutinised by the commit-
tees. Though the AL government amended some laws, it failed to improve
the system. For instance, according to the amendment, the minister concerned
remained a member of the committee provided that he was an MP. It is
assumed that such an amendment was intended to maintain executive domi-
nance over the legislature. Lastly, opposition MPs or ruling party backbench-
ers had very little opportunity to act as watchdogs due to restrictions on floor
crossing.
A rule regarding the standing committee states that, ‘all government Bills
introduced in Parliament would be referred to a Standing Committee for
examination and report to Parliament before the Bill was taken up by the
House for immediate consideration’. However, another clause in the law
adds that ‘certain kinds of Bills cannot be referred to any committee’. This
makes the earlier rule weak as the government can easily apply its discretion-
ary power based on this later clause to prevent any bill it wants from going to
the standing committee.
The parliamentary standing committees maintain public accountability
through controlling public expenditure, maintaining government’s transpar-
ency, accelerating administrative dynamics and holding the executive answer-
able to the parliament. But the problems discussed above indicate that
the committee system failed to provide the intended services. Yet despite
limitations some committees were found to be more active and performed
well. Table 10 shows that the total number of committees formed during the
three parliaments was almost the same. The committees under the Seventh
Parliament held the highest number of meetings, but compared to the other
two parliaments, they produced fewer reports. On the other hand, two-thirds
of the committees during Fifth and Seventh Parliaments failed to produce
any report compared to the committees of the Eighth Parliament where only
ten committees failed to do so. Therefore, in terms of committee activities,
the Eighth Parliament performed much better despite having the highest
number of committees and least number of meetings among the three.
Interpolation (question/answer) is a standard parliamentary method to
ensure accountability of the government to parliament. However, during all
the three parliaments it was common for ministers to follow three patterns
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while responding to questions. The first was avoidance of responsibility and
failure by simply refusing to accept the facts presented by the opposition.
For instance, the AL government failed to acknowledge its major failure in
handling the share market collapse in 1996. Second, ministers repeatedly
shifted responsbility for failure to the opposition. For instance, the JI was
held responsible immediately after a massive bomb attack on a cultural pro-
gramme in Jessore in 1999. The government also blamed the JI for a terrorist
attack in Chittagong on 12 July 2000. The statements made by ministers the
following day were regarded by many as highly irresponsible.18 And, third,
the government often resorted to ‘conspiracy theory’ to avoid its responsibil-
ities. For instance, in 1997 an electricity tower collapsed due to theft of screws
but this was held up by the AL government as an act of sabotage by the
opposition.
To improve the parliamentary accountability of government, the Seventh
Parliament introduced Prime Minister’s Question Time. However, despite
its novelty, its use in the Seventh and Eighth Parliaments remained extremely
low. This was because of a number of factors such as the fact that the time allo-
cated was only 30 minutes once a week; questions were not asked directly;
answers were given to selected questions in a set format; and, especially,
the poor quality of questions asked.19 Furthermore, it was noted during the
PM’s question and answer sessions in the Seventh Parliament that even
when a question was directed at the prime minister, another cabinet minister
would routinely stand up to respond on the PM’s behalf. But, above all, the
device proved to be useless due to frequent absence of the PM from the
House. The Eighth Parliament hardly held any such session.
Factors Responsible for the Dysfunctional Parliamentary System
Why did political parties maintain such an attitude towards the parliament in
Bangladesh? What were the factors that contributed to the existing nature of
Table 10. Comparative performance of the standing committees in the three
parliaments
Types Fifth Seventh Eighth
Total committees 46 46 48
Total committee meetings 1388 1485 1242
Average meetings (per committee, per year) 6.03 6.46 8.63
Total reports submitted 49 28 47
Average reports submitted (per committee) 1.07 0.61 0.98
Committees did not produce any reports 30 29 10
Source: Rahman (2007).
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parliamentary politics in Bangladesh? An extensive analysis of these questions
would require a greater space than available in the present article. However, a
modest attempt is necessary to shed some light on these questions. The follow-
ing factors could be held largely responsible for the dysfunctional nature of
parliament in Bangladesh: violence and agitation as political culture, personal
hegemony of party leadership, and an undemocratic party system.
Violence and Agitation as Political Culture
Although the political culture of any nation originates from its ethno-cultural
and national characteristics, there are some forms of political behaviour that
become part of political culture over time due to their persistent pattern and
overt presence. In Bangladesh, the origin of violence in politics could be
traced in the British colonial era, but it became a popular political means
from the beginning of the Pakistan period. The opposition during the 1950s
and 1960s remained violent and agitational on issues like language movement,
Six Points Demand and Agartala Trial.20 During the 1980s political violence
became commonplace in the move to unseat the Ershad regime. From the
beginning of the 1990s, political violence became further institutionalised
through inter-party conflict. Eventually, violence became a legitimate means
of securing political demands. Violence, disturbances and interruption of nor-
malcy in public life become part of the political landscape overshadowing the
role and importance of parliament. The number of major hartals and political
strikes the parties observed, as discussed earlier, substantiate the point.
Personal Hegemony of Party Leadership
In Bangladesh politics, parties have always been associated with personalities
instead of principles. Since independence in 1971, political parties have
remained highly personalised around a few leaders such as Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and his daughter Sheikh Hasina for the AL, Ziaur Rahman and his
widow Khaleda for the BNP, Ershad and his wife Rawshan for the JP, and
Ghulam Azam for the JI. The communist and socialist parties have maintained
their leadership unchanged since the 1970s. These political leaders were insti-
tutions in themselves in the sense that their hegemonic leadership inside the
party remained unchallenged, unchanged, unopposed and unquestioned. Due
to this privileged leadership, the personal preferences, interests and decisions
of the leaders were considered to be party decisions as well.
The personal hegemony of party leadership can probably be explained by
two factors. Firstly, the reverence and sympathy for their assassinated
predecessors exalted the image of the current leaders of the AL and BNP.
And secondly, as a consequence, the very survival and integrity of the AL,
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BNP and JP was regarded as depending on the continuity and hegemonic
leadership of the current leaders. Experience shows that breakaway leader-
ships and parties such as Gana Forum of Kamal Hossain, BNP-Obaed of
Obaidur Rahman and JP-Manju of Naziur Rahman Manju have proved un-
popular. These factors in party leadership make their leaders autocratic in
running parties.
Undemocratic Party System
In a multiparty democracy, democracy within political parties is essential.
Democracy within political parties makes them inculcate democratic values
and principles of collective and consultative decision-making, representation
through elections, tolerance of criticism and differences of opinions, and
accommodativeness. However, political parties in Bangladesh are not run
according to democratic principles. Due to the absence of internal party
democracy, the parties suffer from a number of problems such as dominance
of personality rather than rules; the maintenance of leadership so that it tends
to be a lifetime position; and finally, the dynastic nature of party leadership.
The last two problems appear to be more serious. There has been no leadership
change in the AL, BNP and JP during the last three decades. Furthermore, the
current leaders have inherited their positions (Hasina of AL being the daughter
of Sheikh Mujib, Khaleda being the widow of General Ziaur Rahman).
Leadership in the JP and communist parties are also person-oriented. And
finally, the AL, BNP and JP are in the process of handing down party leadership
to family members (Hasina and Khaleda to their sons and Ershad to his wives).
So, the undemocratic nature of running the parties has made the party
leadership stagnant, dynastic, authoritarian and autocratic (Hossain &
Lowey, 1994). Party decisions regarding roles in the parliament or outside
the parliament are largely shaped by the style of party leadership. Such a
nature of parties helps leaders easily avoid public responsibility.
Recently, civil society and interest groups have become critical of the beha-
viour of political parties and their leaders. Specifically, demands for political
reforms in relation to leadership, party political culture and hartals are strong.
Public resentment is also on the rise against violence and street politics. Since
the beginning of the 2006 caretaker government (October) demands for
political reforms including internal party reforms have become even stronger.
Officially, the interim government has introduced a number of electoral
reforms which require parties to bring fundamental changes in the party
system. The clearest attempt the interim government made was to remove
the leaders of the AL and BNP from politics, unofficially known as the ‘poli-
tics minus two’ formula, in the face of strong resistance from, the parties.
However, irrespective of the party stand, it is understood by many that the
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future of parliamentary democracy in the country depends mainly on reform in
the political practices, party leadership and introduction of the rule of law.
Conclusion
Parliamentary democracy existed in Bangladesh during 1991–2006. The three
parliaments during this period achieved a number of successes such as making
the parliamentary system constitutional, signing the Ganges Water Sharing
and the CHT Peace treaties, and above all maintaining the parliamentary
system for such a long period (Mannan, 1996).
However, these achievements were overshadowed by the ineffective and
dysfunctional state of the parliament caused by deliberate bypassing by the
ruling party and desertion by the opposition. The three parliaments remained
virtually dysfunctional for a large part of their tenure. Parliamentary politics
suffered from excessive use of extra-parliamentary means. Institutionally,
the parliament remained practically paralysed due to prolonged and frequent
boycotts, and it failed to become the centre of legislation. In addition to pol-
itical disregard, the internal administrative inefficiency of the parliament also
greatly tarnished its institutional image.
Therefore, evaluated from the viewpoint of liberal democracy and its essen-
tial characteristics such as responsibility, transparency, tolerance, accountabil-
ity, trust, respect, recognition and cooperation, it can be said that these have
not developed in the political parties and the politicians during the parliamen-
tary era. Although political parties agitated on the streets in the name of par-
liamentary democracy, these parties themselves kept the parliament
dysfunctional. Political parties and politicians were good at anti-democratic
movements, but did not become competent for living in and with democracy.
Unless politicians and political parties inculcate these characteristics of parlia-
mentary norms and rules of engagement, one may reasonably become scepti-
cal about the future of a healthy parliamentary system in Bangladesh. It was
indeed due to the unparliamentary behaviour of the parties that the continuity
of the parliamentary system was interrupted by emergency rule from January
2007 to December 2008.
Notes
1. It became a common behaviour of the opposition parties in Bangladesh since the mid
1980s to denounce elections results; boycott parliamentary sessions, and resort to fre-
quent mass demonstration, protests, transport and industrial strikes to unseat the govern-
ment. The opposition politics remained more active in the streets than in the parliament.
2. Sheikh Mujib was released from prison in Pakistan and returned to independent
Bangladesh on 10 January 1972.
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3. Sheikh Mujib was assassinated on 15 August 1975. The AL observes the anniversary as a
day of mourning.
4. This law in 1965 confiscated the properties of the Hindus who left for India during the
Indo-Pakistani war.
5. The Bangladesh constitution allows a member of parliament to remain absent from the
House consecutively for 90 days, after which s/he is stripped of membership.
6. Ghulam Azam, a Bangladeshi by birth and leader of JI, was outside Bangladesh when it
became independent in 1971. He opposed the war of independence and sided with the
Pakistani regime. He came back to Bangladesh in 1979 with a Pakistani passport. He
then stayed in the country and acted as a de facto leader of JI, and in 1989 publicly
declared himself as a Bangladeshi by birth. Interestingly, the AL leader personally met
Ghulam Azam soon after the 1991 elections to seek his party support to form the
cabinet. The JI did not extend its support to AL.
7. Ghulam Azam challenged the government in the court and his citizenship was restored by
the Supreme Court in 1994.
8. Ninian Stephen proposed forming an interim government composed of five AL, five BNP
and one technocrat members to conduct the general elections. But the AL rejected the
deal.
9. Hartal refers to total stoppage of activities in all sectors of life called by political parties.
10. Weekly Bichitra, 30 Dec. 1994.
11. Weekly 2000, No. 7, 23 June 2000, p. 8.
12. Weekly Jaijaidin, No. 36, 20 June 2000, p. 29.
13. ‘Four years of AL rule’, Weekly 2000, 23 June 2000, No. 7, pp. 35–43.
14. Weekly Jaijaidin, 13 June 2000, No. 35, p. 4.
15. Weekly Jaijaidin, 12 Sept. 2000, No. 48, p. 5.
16. The popularly known Janata Tower case refers to a corruption case involving Ershad and
his wife, Ms Raushan Ershad, regarding purchase of a plot of land of the Dhaka Improve-
ment Trust for construction of a building named Janata Tower for his daily newspaper
Janata. The Anti-Corruption Department brought charges against Ershad of misusing
power in purchase of the and while he was President of the country. Both Ershad and
his wife and others were convicted in the case.
17. A detailed account is available in Weekly Jaijaidin, 5 Sept. 2000, No. 47, pp. 5–8.
18. Weekly Robbar, Vol. XXII, No. 33, 23 July 2000, pp. 13–19.
19. For example, one ruling party MP’s question was ‘is it true Honourable Prime Minister
that you have been selected for FAO prize? If it is then what is your feeling as PrimeMin-
ister. Furthermore, to what extent the prize would increase the honour of Bangladesh in
the world?’ Parliamentary Session, 7 Sept. 1999.
20. The language movement during 1948–52 created the first massive anti-government
movement in the demand for Bangla to be made the state language against the govern-
ment decision to replace it with Urdu, a foreign language for the people. The Six Points
Movement in the 1960s generated massive opposition demanding greater political and
economic autonomy for the then East Pakistan; and the violent anti-government move-
ment dominated 1960s politics following Agartala Trial of the AL leader Sheikh Mujib.
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